

A warm welcome to the July 2022 publication of the TPN online newsletter. This is a landmark edition marking the return of Transatlantic Week to Washington DC as an in-person meeting for the first time since 2018.

Our content is designed to offer a few ideas and opinions that could help to move the transatlantic relationship towards strong and effective partnership in 2030. Transatlantic Week will be key to setting TPN's working priorities for 2023 and 2024.

Although the economic and geopolitical context is grim and dangerous, our authors Anthony Gardner, Jamie Shea and James Elles offer positive and practical ideas for developing the partnership in its important political and security aspects.

Vivien Haig & the TPN team.

There is an exciting buzz at TPN as the first in-person Transatlantic Week since 2018 approaches on July 18 in Washington DC. We are at a critical moment for international peace and security when war in Europe and superpower global rivalries throw the necessity of closer transatlantic partnership into sharp relief.

John Wyles reports...



**Transatlantic Week 2022
July 18-20 at the Library of Congress,
Washington DC**

Facing the Challenges Ahead Together: Towards Transatlantic Partnership 2030

The return of Transatlantic Week as an in-person meeting for the first time since 2018 marks July 18 2022 as a special date in the Washington DC calendar. In the 12 years since the first edition of this annual meeting, Transatlantic Week has become a diary priority for legislators, policymakers, analysts and business strategists focused on building new bridges across the Atlantic, and strengthening old ones.

This year's meeting at the Library of Congress will bring together senior political leaders from the Congress and the European Parliament alongside companies that play major roles in the transatlantic economy. In addition, both the Biden Administration and the European Commission are fielding top-line officials on several discussion panels.

A perilous and challenging moment

The goal of this year's meeting remains firmly that of its predecessors – to work for a more tightly bonded transatlantic partnership between the EU and US based on discussion, debate and strategic collaboration. TPN has set a 2030 target date against which progress towards partnership will be measured, including reforms that would enable closer cooperation between transatlantic institutions.

This edition of the newsletter is designed to throw out ideas and stimulate debate. Our three headline contributions follow an interesting timeline. Anthony Gardner, the former US Ambassador to the EU recalls his initial surprise after arriving in Brussels in 2014 at the range of issues and responsibilities that the EU was already undertaking. Its expansion of activities continued – especially in the area of sanctions – throughout his term which ended in 2017.

We are very firmly anchored in the present by Jamie Shea, professor of Strategy and Security at the University of Exeter and an acclaimed expert on NATO. Examining the Declaration adopted by the Madrid summit at the end of June, Jamie welcomes the broader approach to cooperating with the EU outlined in NATO's new strategic concept. But he has found important lacunae in suggested collaborations, especially on space policies.

TPN Chairman, James Elles demonstrates that looking back can unlock the future. He argues that the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) of 1995 and this year's Joint Transatlantic Agenda (JTA) adopted at the June EU-US summit are

both valid as sources of ideas for building a partnership framework up to 2030 and beyond.

He draws attention to the fact that the recent JTA fails to pick up on two key ideas that attracted attention to the NTA: one was the need to include the business community in forging transatlantic links and the other was the “great importance” attached to enhanced parliamentary links.

The relationship has not faced a more perilous and challenging necessity for urgent change in the past 70 years. Europe and the US stand in defence of democracy, human rights and economic freedoms at a time of war in Europe and simultaneous economic, energy and food supply crises. Determined to deter Russia from further aggression, the US, the EU and other European countries have worked in full public gaze during June (EU Summit, G7 meeting, NATO heads of government) to achieve maximum political unity and a very significant strengthening of NATO’s defensive capabilities.

Participants at the Washington meeting will wrestle with multiple challenges during 14 sessions sharply focused on the raft of dangers and disruptions through which we are living. It is already clear that any relaxation of effort in the competition for power, position and influence between western democracies and the Sino-Russian authoritarian axis risks the loss of advantages that will be hard to regain.

A partnership for global crisis and geopolitical rivalry

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, executed and sustained with the support of China, has generated the threads of global crisis and geopolitical struggle that run through the TA Week agenda.

Discussion will focus on how the relationship can be strengthened and developed to deal effectively with a compendium of difficulties that may take years to resolve.

These include large, politically difficult increases in defence spending, harnessing digital technologies for economic competitiveness and national security; securing oil and gas supplies at economically tolerable prices; establishing food production and supplies on a globally safe footing and avoiding a swing back to greater use of fossil fuels.

These daunting challenges to public policies are set in a context of soaring price

inflation on goods and food supplies that threatens to put essential products beyond reach for the world's poorest populations.

TA Week 2022 will be a vital phase in TPN's attempt to sharpen perceptions and understanding of current crises and to point to possible solutions. The immediate task will be to define TPN's 2023 priorities to help carry the partnership forward to 2024 and beyond to 2030. Priorities might include:

- Working together on an evaluation of global trends to 2030 and beyond, assessing possible transatlantic policy responses that may be required;
- Highlighting the central importance of progressing towards the goals of the 2021 Joint Transatlantic Agenda and securing the opportunities for technological and regulatory advances through the work of the Trade and Technology Council;
- Recognising that the partnership needs to be underpinned by popular understanding, trust and consent that can be best achieved within an assembly framework of regular contacts, discussion and coordination between EU and US legislators;
- Formulating ideas which help set a new compass for the transatlantic partners to navigate through a turbulent environment provoked by wide-ranging geopolitical events. The need is to embed a future transatlantic relationship, driven by shared interests, within a broad partnership framework which will last for decades to come.



Anthony Gardner

Former US Ambassador to the European Union

Anthony Gardner was appointed by President Barak Obama in 2014, and his term lasted until his departure in 2017 and the arrival at the White House of Donald Trump.

Rediscovering each other

Tony Gardner reflects on the remarkable improvement in post-Trump transatlantic relations since President Joe Biden came into office. John Wyles, Senior TPN Fellow and editor of this newsletter, asked the former Ambassador what had surprised him most about the EU when he took over in 2014....

AG: I was surprised at the depth and breadth of the relationship in areas that I had not been aware of, for example in law enforcement cooperation, in military and security cooperation, and even in areas such as foreign aid and humanitarian systems.

At the same time, I was certainly aware of the depth and breadth of our relationship in trade and in regulatory issues, including digital. However, my involvement in sanctions coordination really drove home to me that the EU is an important partner of the United States thanks to certain unique assets.

JW: And how does the relationship look to you now?

AG: I think it's in good shape. I give this administration very, very high marks for how it has managed the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. The crisis has really helped the EU emerge as a critical partner in the minds I think of top US officials. The EU has moved in ways I never thought possible frankly, and we've done so much more together than we did 8 years ago.

JW: Despite a few wobbles?

AG: Yes, there have been a few including the Afghan pull-out, and some unfortunate tensions over the US-UK-Australia submarine deal. I think we've gone well past those unfortunate episodes, and we now have rediscovered each other as really important partners.

And I think it's very timely because there were certain high officials in the Biden administration who have appeared to be almost entirely focused on China and on looking to Asian allies for military and security solutions to the Chinese threat.

JW: As you know, there is nothing like a good crisis to encourage the EU to take a

leap forward in cohesion and policy alignment. What in particular has surprised you?

AG: I never thought it imaginable that the EU would provide €500 million for the purchases of lethal equipment by a non-EU country. That's incredible. And then we have Germany reversing decades of foreign policy. And I never thought imaginable that the EU 27 would take the measures that were recently taken in the sixth sanctions package on oil and gas. They've imposed and will impose real pain on economies and voters at a time when everyone in the EU really wanted to move beyond the Covid. So I'm full of admiration.

Now it's true there are many things that did not happen that should clearly have happened after 2014 (Russian invasion of the Crimea). Decisions on building gas infrastructure that should have been taken by certain Member States did not happen - terminals which we knew were necessary were not built, while the southern corridor gas pipeline which we knew was necessary didn't really move ahead.

Merkel's banning of the nuclear industry was a mistake as was the decision to move ahead with the Nordstream gas pipeline.

JW: And is Putin's war adding strength to the transatlantic relationship that might otherwise not have happened, or would have taken years to emerge?

AG: We owe Vladimir Putin a huge thanks for doing the impossible, including on the security and defence side. There are so many examples. Who would have thought that Denmark would have this historical vote to reverse its opt out from EU or who would have thought that Sweden and Finland would vote to join NATO. Or that defence expenditures would go up.

Now we shouldn't be complacent because we all know from history that this glow can wear off as the rubber hits the road and certain divisions resurface about how to distribute the pain.

With many millions of tons of grain exports blocked and many parts of the third world very dependent on those supplies the pressures will indeed mount and of course Putin is well aware of that. He may think that that time is actually playing into his hands because there are just innumerable ways in which cracks in western unity can show up. Hopefully he's wrong.

EU has emerged with hard power

JW: And would you say that American perceptions of the EU as a reliable partner are changing?

AG: It's hard to talk about US perceptions because we're talking about a very small group of people who focus on this stuff. There are officials who don't focus on trade and economic and regulatory issues and there have been a few who were skeptical of the EU because they focus on partners who bring military and security solutions to the table.

As far as they were concerned, the EU was always going to be a kind of secondary actor. But perceptions have changed because the EU has emerged as relevant with hard power at a time of real crisis— and not just in the form of sanctions.

There are ways that the EU can leverage its position through the single market. Its regulatory powers have real significance, and we're seeing some of these issues play out in the Trade and Technology Council. Here I'm thinking about export controls as an example. I mean this is true power, and unfortunately underestimated by some top US officials, I had to deal with sceptics myself when I was serving in Brussels. There will always be some.

JW: But are there fewer skeptics now about the EU in DC given evidence of a deepening and widening partnership?

AG: Well yes. I do think we are now more aligned than we have been on many core issues. Certainly on Russia which we now perceive as radically changed, but also on China. I think that the disalignment that existed five plus years ago is now considerably narrower and the skepticism about Russia has grown. We've seen the EU move in important ways with the anti-coercion instrument and with the procurement instruments. And the EU is working with the US in the Trade and Technology Council on issues that are particularly relevant with regards to China. So absolutely the EU is more reliable.

An Indo-Pacific role for the EU?

JW: And do you think that American expectations extend also to Europeans assuming more security responsibilities in the Indo-Pacific?

AG: I think that would be welcomed. Look, during the Obama years we always welcomed a greater footprint of the EU on security issues. There were very few skeptics as I recall on this topic. We always thought it (the EU) was complementary and not competitive, with NATO or with Transatlantic institutions. So I think it would be welcomed if Europe could take on more responsibilities within Europe or indeed out of area including in the Indo-Pacific.

JW: But of course one of the acid tests that the Europeans do have to confront is

strengthening military capabilities through increased resources and more effective collaborations.

AG: Indeed, everyone talks about budgets but it's also about how that money is spent. It's about efficiency of expenditure. The figures are truly eye-popping. I remember looking into many examples of this – I'll just mention one. Belgium is a remarkable case study. The last set of figures I saw – perhaps now a few years old - indicated that Belgium was spending about one percent of its 550 billion GDP on defence, OK? But that's not the most striking thing. The most striking thing is that I think 60 percent or even more of that amount was being spent on soft things that were not relevant to capability in the battlefield - i.e. pensions and salaries and so forth – and the rest was being spent on kit, equipment.

This will not be easy to reverse, but doing so will have real consequences for interoperability and also for lowering costs. So this is a major topic for driving pan-European defence consolidation.

European attitudes to military spending are evolving

JW: The continuing failure of many European NATO members to meet spending targets has been a real source of tension in their relations with the US over a long period. Will it continue?

AG: Well John in politics even things that are logical and should be done don't happen. They don't happen because interests are not aligned. Interests are not aligned because there are significant economic powers that don't want this to happen. Some countries are loathe to drive consolidation because they want national industries, national champions, in areas that are sensitive to identity, which is obviously the case with defence.

So things that should happen don't happen, even when there is kind of agreement at the top political level.

But things are changing quickly. I remember seeing a few polls done by the Pew Research Centre which revealed that, until recently, Europeans didn't really see a threat on their borders and, as I recall it, a majority in many Member States said that they didn't think their country should come to the defence of a fellow EU member if attacked. I think that perception has radically changed. and people say now they are willing to spend money on and perhaps to do things that once, they didn't think were really necessary.

JW: Do you worry at all about the enduring strength of pacifist opinion in some European NATO members?

AG: Absolutely. They're quiet, for obvious reasons. In Italy some of the well-known politicians whom I won't name who were either friendly to Russia or with pacifist leanings are dissenting from current policies saying that violence or military solutions are never the right answer to a threat.

We need to sort of capitalise on this terrible series of events to make the case for security as a key issue. Some decisions will in any case be hard to reverse, Sweden and Finland joining NATO for example. That is a fundamental shift. I think even in Germany perceptions are hardening as more and more news of Russian war crimes filter out. It will be a hard case to make that Germany should not be spending more on defence.

Outlook for mid-term elections "pretty grim"

JW: What are the most immediate tests that the relationship still now has to deal with and overcome?

AG: Well, we have midterm elections coming up in the US which is obvious. It looks pretty grim and the outcome could well constrain the President's ability to do certain things domestically and in foreign policy. God forbid we go back to the Trump years after the presidential elections in 2024. That will have a dramatic impact on the transatlantic relationship, even more so than during the original four Trump years. That's the most obvious test.

I think it will be a challenge for us to keep to sanctions packages and even build on them as their impact on us becomes manifest.

I think other challenges are looming. The fate of the Iran accord is one of them. How to handle China is certainly another as focus shifts back to the Indo-Pacific. And lack of patience will probably re-emerge in Washington with the speed at which the EU moves on the challenges we think are related to putting pressure on China. So, we are not out of the woods. I should end by saying I think there is so much more we could and should be doing on trade together, but it's just politically impossible right now for the United States.

JW: Do you think that if the midterms go as badly for the Democrats as many expect, some of the energy and commitment will be drained out of efforts to build the relationship? Could there, for example, be much less political drive behind the TTC?

AG: Well, most of the topics of the TTC, I think, are pretty bi-partisan. So I'm not sure there will be an impact there. There are several topics I do not see as particularly partisan: screening foreign direct investment, export controls, cooperation to

ensure access to critical raw materials such as rare earths, coordinating our subsidies for semi-conductors. There are others.

The issue is what can we actually get done together, quickly. It's a great series of objectives we've set for the TTC but they are awfully broad. And my experience with what we did under Obama is that one needs to have a very small subset of issues on which we're all focused and needing concrete outcomes. With a third TTC meeting coming up later in the year, we need to see real outcomes and not just exhortatory communiqués and declarations.

Lack of awareness in the Congress "of what the EU does"

JW: Does the Transatlantic relationship have many friends in Congress, and how can we get more?

AG: It does and here I'm not only thinking about the Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue, the TLD, which has been going on for a long time, and does important work on a bipartisan basis.

But you know that on the Hill, the question will always be "What has Europe done for us recently?"

And here I think the Europeans are sometimes a bit shy because Congressmen and Women and Senators are not always aware of what the EU and its Member States have actually done a lot in some areas. Now they're aware of sanctions, but they're not aware of other things that Europe does that are really important. Law enforcement is one of them and climate change another, Perhaps it is more of a partisan issue than it should be but there are a lot of other opportunities for Europe to be making the case, "this is where we could be relevant to you, America, on issues of general concern".

JW: Is it also as it were a communications problem in the sense that the EU's profile with the Congress in Washington is too low?

AG: On the TLD it is a difficult issue because the Parliament has its own internal rules about who shows up to these meetings. Its not always the case that people show up who are knowledgeable and competent for the issues being discussed. I attended I think three, of these meetings, and I detected that, frankly, when the wrong people were in the room talking about the wrong things, this has an impact on who shows up. This should change, but unfortunately I don't think it can or will change. I would like to see some kind of a dialogue including the Senate, but that will not be easy because these are busy people who do not perceive that it is a good use of their time. So I don't have a clear answer for you. It's a thorny question.



Jamie Shea

Professor of Strategy and Security, Exeter University

Glass half full, or half empty? Jamie Shea casts a critical eye over NATO's vision of enhanced cooperation with the EU in its new Strategic Concept.



Jamie Patrick Shea CMG is a retired member of NATO. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium until his retirement in late September 2018. He received worldwide attention during the 1999 Kosovo War, when he served as the spokesperson for NATO.

Both the Madrid Summit Declaration and the new NATO Strategic Concept issued at the Summit have paragraphs devoted to the future of EU-NATO relations. The paragraph in the Declaration is rather succinct and generic. It uses traditional language and does not

contain concrete or innovative proposals. The language in the Strategic Concept is more forward leaning and substantive in this regard. It describes the EU as “a unique and essential partner”. It affirms NATO’s willingness to develop the EU-NATO relationship further and cites areas such as political consultations, military mobility, resilience, the security aspects of climate change, emerging and disruptive technologies, cyber and hybrid warfare and tackling the challenge of a rising China.

Cooperation extended to include climate change and “militarising” China

Some of these areas have been on the EU-NATO agenda for quite some time already, such as cooperation on military mobility or cyber defence or hybrid warfare and countering disinformation campaigns. Women, Peace and Security is another area.

So the interest will focus on the new areas, such as climate change, emerging and disruptive technologies and especially tackling the challenges of a rising, rapidly militarising and assertive China. Given all the sensitivities involved and economic and strategic interests on both sides of the Atlantic, and the already existing EU Indo-Pacific Strategy and the bilateral US-EU dialogue on China and Trade and Technology Council, it will be interesting to see how the EU and NATO organise their exchanges on China, and whether these really will bring any added value to the current transatlantic coordination vis a vis Beijing.

No priority for Space despite growing EU capabilities

It is noteworthy and strange that space and the increasing militarisation of space are not on the agenda for the future EU-NATO relationship. NATO declared space as a new domain of operations at its summit in London in 2019 and the importance of space is underlined in the Strategic Concept.

The EU has developed considerable space capabilities, including in the military domain, and the Commission has just proposed a new Space Package, with the emphasis on constellations of satellites for encrypted communications and the enhancement of space situational awareness. Space is an area where the EU has capabilities, such as its Galileo military positioning system, that could be of use to NATO. Both institutions also have an interest in developing proposals for more arms control measures as well as cooperation with the private sector in space. So given all these overlaps it is surprising that space is not an area which NATO has prioritised for its future dialogue with the other side of Brussels.

More could have been said about support for EU in Africa

Another glaring gap is Africa and the South. There are paragraphs in the

Declaration and the Concept that describe the multifaceted challenges arising from Africa including illegal migration, terrorism and human security undermined by climate change. The EU will be in the lead here as NATO's priority shifts to Russia and Eastern Europe and the EU has more experience of operations and defence capacity building on the African continent. So the Concept could have said some useful things on how NATO might support EU initiatives and operations in Africa, for instance the strengthening of the G5 Sahel counter-terrorism task force now that Mali has withdrawn from it.

No mention of EU Strategic Autonomy

Moreover, given the salience of the war in Ukraine, more could be said on how NATO and the EU can consult more regularly on a long term strategy to contain Russia and reduce dependencies on that country, together with how they could work together to increase the resilience of partners under threat from Moscow, such as Georgia and Moldova.

The EU will be pleased by the endorsement that the NATO Strategic Concept gives to the efforts to build a European defence, although there are the usual references to the need for this to be complementary to NATO. Yet there is no reference to the goal of EU Strategic Autonomy nor to the higher level of ambition for EU defence and specific capabilities initiatives contained in the recently adopted EU Strategic Compass.

As so often in the past, NATO calls on the EU to involve to the fullest extent possible the non-EU allies in its planning and capabilities development programmes, such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund. It clearly recognises the importance of these programmes to the overall effectiveness of NATO's collective defence and hopes to optimise synergy in this area so that both institutions can learn and benefit from each other's capabilities development and pooling and sharing projects while avoiding, as always, the dreaded spectre of "duplication".

Greater clarity and prioritisation still needed

A little surprisingly too, no reference is made to a third joint EU-NATO Joint Declaration which has been in the works for some time, and is intended to take the EU-NATO relationship beyond the current 74 areas of inter-action. Yet this document should appear in the near future.

In sum, the the new Strategic Concept increases usefully the level of ambition for the EU-NATO relationship and suggests new areas of cooperation, like climate change and disruptive technologies, where both institutions are striving to catch up with fast paced developments.

It reflects the new reality that the EU is increasingly important to the alliance's capacity to manage the full spectrum of 21st century security threats and in a 360 degree geographical radius. Yet some key areas have been left out and the mechanisms for delivering this new enhanced relationship across Brussels are still to be clarified. Especially who is in the lead on which issue, how duplication is to be avoided in practice and how NATO can support the EU when it plays the leading role, notably in Africa?

With so many existing areas of cooperation already and more being added, some prioritisation will also be required. These will be the tasks for the months ahead and with the aim of providing more detail and substance at NATO's next summit in Vilnius in 2023.

Professor Shea has contributed a detailed analysis of the Alliance post 24 February providing an excellent background for the discussions in Transatlantic Week entitled:

Annual Stocktaking Analysis on NATO/US/EU Security structures: where do we need to go now?



James Elles

Chairman, TPN Board

James Elles draws attention to the need to revive and modify

some long standing creative ideas for strengthening the transatlantic relationship.



James Elles is the Chairman of the Transatlantic Policy Network, which he founded in 1992. He was a Conservative Party Member of the European Parliament from 1984 to 2014. He also founded the European Internet Forum (EIF) with two MEP colleagues in 2000, and still remains a member of the Steering Committee. He laid the foundation for creating the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) by tabling two budget amendments in 2010 and 2012. Their purpose was to establish an inter-institutional system looking closely at long-term trends with a view to providing foresight, feeding in principal ideas into strategic policy-making. James is the ESPAS Honorary President.

No one can doubt that transatlantic cooperation is back on the agenda, not least as the Western response deepens following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. US EU dialogues and contacts between leading US and EU administration officials on sectoral issues are at an unprecedented level. Alongside, NATO expanded its security umbrella adopting a new Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in late June. Three legitimate questions arise about US EU cooperation. Where has it come from? What has it achieved so far? And where should it be headed?

Where has it come from?

Compared with the NATO Treaty, signed in 1949, the EU US relationship is a recent development and has been promoted by US EU Summit decisions, rather than by a Treaty or a Partnership Agreement (eg the EU Canada Cooperation Agreement).

For its origin, you have to go back to the days after the fall of the Berlin Wall to 23 November 1990 when the Transatlantic Declaration was signed between the US and the EU in Brussels. This is a short document, 3 pages long, written in the style of the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of January 1963. After a page of preambles, it sets out the decision to 'endow their relationship with long-term perspectives', reaffirming their determination further to strengthen their partnership through focussing on 6 common

goals. They agreed to inform and consult each other 'on important matters of common interest...with a view of bringing their positions as close as possible' in order to achieve them. This included economic cooperation as well as trans-national challenges.

Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations, 1990 (click to link)

Particularly interesting is a detailed section on the Institutional framework for Consultation, including bi-annual consultations between the President of the European Council and President of the European Commission, on the one side, and the President of the United States on the other. Such consultations were also envisaged between the Commission and the US Government at Cabinet level.

This document is the basis upon which the EU and the US have organised their US EU Summit meetings, the first Summit taking place in December 1995.

What has it achieved so far?

Stemming from the Transatlantic Declaration, there have so far been 10 EU US Summits of varying degrees of importance from 1995 to 2021. Notable initiatives have been the setting up of the Transatlantic Economic Council (Washington 2007) and the commitment to conclude negotiations on TTIP in the interest of economic growth and job creation (Brussels 2014)

But the two most substantive Summits setting out detailed actions for the EU and the US were the first top-level meetings which took place in December 1995 ushering in the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), along with its detailed joint Action Plan, and the most recent one in June 2021 creating the Joint Transatlantic Agenda (JTA).

A) The New Transatlantic Agenda was closely aligned, as would be expected, to the Transatlantic Declaration. The following 4 key points were its focus of action:
Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world;

Responding to global challenges, including international crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism, climate change, the environment or diseases;

Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations, strengthening the multilateral trading system and promoting closer economic relations;

Building bridges across the Atlantic, forging closer ties between professionals in business, science, education and culture.

The New Transatlantic Agenda (click to link)

B) The Joint Transatlantic Agenda focusses on the following 4 points, entitled "Towards a renewed Transatlantic Partnership":

End the COVID-19 pandemic, prepare for future global health challenges, and drive forward a sustainable global recovery;

Protect our planet and foster green growth;

Strengthen trade, investment and technological cooperation, including the setting up of the Trade and Technological Council;

Build a more democratic, peaceful and secure world.

Summit Statement on Joint Transatlantic Agenda (click to link)

There are three notable differences between these two texts that risk interpretation as a narrowing of vision and ambition over time:

First, in the NTA, there is specific reference to the inclusion of the business community in building bridges across the Atlantic. No such reference is made in the JTA.

Second concerns parliamentary links. The NTA includes this paragraph:

"We attach great importance to enhanced parliamentary links. We will consult parliamentary leaders on both sides of the Atlantic regarding consultative mechanism, including those building on existing institutions, to discuss matters related to our transatlantic partnership"

No such declaration was included in the JTA.

Third, there is no time limit of the duration for the NTA nor of the Transatlantic Declaration. The former could legitimately be regarded as an operational document for deepening cooperation of equal or greater importance than the JTA. Building transatlantic links with the business communities and between parliaments needs to be regarded as even greater priorities now than when the Declaration was adopted.

Where should we now be headed?

As we approach TA Week 2022, there is a strong call to try to "fireproof" the EU US relationship, so that it can be truly effective in handling the innumerable joint challenges up ahead towards 2030. Looking at the situation above, there are 3 proposals which could help create a new compass for transatlantic relations in the 2020's, firmly derived from the original Transatlantic Declaration:

First, it would be sensible to bring together the NTA and the JTA documents, blending the contents into one roadmap for Transatlantic Partnership, based on joint policy actions.

Second, thought must be given to how to revive the bridge-building ideas contained in the NTA, not least in bringing business into closer operational contact through such frameworks as the TTC mentioned above.

Third, build up the parliamentary links mentioned also in the NTA but not considered at all in the JTA. There can be no progress on closer transatlantic relations without political leadership involving the US Congress and the European Parliament. In this context, the goal of creating an EU US Assembly is a valid objective, bringing all those together who wish to be a part of building the renewed Transatlantic Partnership.

Finally, and not least, an evolving EU US dynamic needs to be properly linked to NATO and its Strategic Concept, agreed in Madrid at the end of June. The excellent paper prepared by Jamie Shea for TPN illustrates just how challenging are the tasks facing NATO as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although some would like NATO to be the sole place to formulate TA strategic thinking, in reality this cannot be done without the sharing of responsibilities with the EU and the US on key issues.

The potential role for TPN in formulating these ideas:

We have a unique position in TPN as we have been involved from the outset in efforts to build a close and effective transatlantic partnership. Launched ceremonially in December 1991 in the presence of the heads of the 3 EU major Institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament), TPN submitted its thoughts to the Spanish Presidency of the Council during late 1994/early 1995, feeding in to the thinking behind the New Transatlantic Agenda.

We kept up the pace in the early 2000's being one of the first to regularly call for the creation of a Transatlantic Market. And then we more recently published ideas in the TPN Papers 'Towards Transatlantic Partnership 2030' where we expressed the view that the partnership needs a stable and lasting framework that will be the natural successor to the NTA and JTA.

We look forward to continued discussion and debate at TA Week 2022, generating ideas that could be helpful in extending and fortifying the role of the TA Partners in the global system. These ideas will help drive our programming during 2022/2023, in preparation for the next TA Week in mid July 2023 in Washington DC.